In this paper, we investigate the design of distributed detection networks in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). We consider the problem of designing binary sensor quantizers that maximize the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence at the fusion center (FC), when subject to a tolerable constraint on the KL divergence at Eve. We assume that the channels between the sensors and the FC (likewise the channels between the sensors and the Eve) are modeled as binary symmetric channels (BSCs). In the case of i.i.d. received symbols at both the FC and Eve, we prove that the structure of the optimal binary quantizers is a likelihood ratio test (LRT). We also present an algorithm to find the threshold of the optimal LRT, and illustrate it for the case of Additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) observation models at the sensors. In the case of non-i.i.d. received symbols at both FC and Eve, we propose a dynamic-programming based algorithm to find efficient quantizers at the sensors. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the performance of the proposed network.
I. INTRODUCTION
D ISTRIBUTED detection has been a well-studied topic over the past three decades, with a wide range of applications ranging from civilian to military purposes [1] - [5] . A distributed detection network comprises of a network of spatially distributed sensors that observe the phenomenon-of-interest (PoI) and send processed information to a fusion center (FC) where a global decision is made regarding the presence or absence of the PoI. In order to design a distributed detection network, the designer needs to choose an appropriate set of sensor quantizers and the fusion rule in the network. Tsitsiklis and Athans showed that the joint design of an optimal distributed detection network is NP-Hard [6] , in general. Therefore, the problem is often decomposed into two design problems [7] , where the problems of the design of sensor quantizers and the fusion rule are considered separately. For example, the optimal fusion rule for a set of known and conditionally independent sensor quantizers is given by the Chair-Varshney rule [8] . In the presence of a large number of sensors where the fusion rule can be abstracted out by adopting error-exponents as performance metrics, several attempts have been made to analyze and design sensor quantizers in the past [9] - [16] under different scenarios in the absence of an eavesdropper. In this paper, we address the problem of designing optimal local quantizers in the presence of an eavesdropper, with Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence as the design metric.
Secrecy in the context of distributed detection networks is an important problem, especially when the network is a sub-system within a larger cyber-physical system. Following are some examples where confidentiality plays a very important role in the context of distributed detection. These practical scenarios involving distributed detection with secrecy requirements motivate the work reported in this paper. First, consider an example of a distributed radar network where the radars observe the presence or absence of an enemy aircraft. Any information about the radar decisions at the enemy aircraft can help it to adapt its strategy so as to remain invisible to the radar and in clandestine pursuit of its mission. Another example is the case of a cognitive-radio (CR) network that employs dynamic spectrum access and spectrum sensing where an eavesdropper may be able to use a given vacant PU channel, without paying any participation costs to the network moderator. Thus, selfishness and maliciousness can be two motives of any eavesdropper to compromise the confidentiality of any inference network.
In the past, a few attempts have been made to address the problem of eavesdropping threats by designing ciphers in the broader context of sensor networks. For example, Aysal et al. in [17] investigated the problem of secure distributed estimation by incorporating a stochastic cipher in the existing sensor networks to improve secrecy. They showed a significant deterioration in Eve's performance (in terms of bias and mean squared error) at the cost of a marginal increase in the estimation variance at the FC. A similar attempt has been made in the context of distributed detection in sensor networks by Nadendla in [18] , where the author presented an optimal network (sensor quantizers, flipping probabilities in the stochastic cipher and the fusion rule) that minimizes the error probability at the FC in the presence of a constraint on Eve's error probability. In [19] , Jeon et al. proposed a cooperative transmission scheme for a sensor network where the sensors are partitioned into non-flipping, flipping and dormant sets, based on the thresholds dictated by the FC. The non-flipping set of sensors quantize the sensed data and transmit them to the FC, while the flipping sensors transmit flipped decisions in order to confuse the Eve. The sensors within the dormant set sleep, in order to conserve energy and we have an energy-efficient sensor network with longer lifetime.
In all of the above attempts, security in distributed detection systems was incorporated as an afterthought in that separate security blocks were added after the original system had been de-signed without considering the possible security threats. Marano et al. in [20] , on the other hand, investigated the problem of designing optimal decision rules for a censoring sensor network in the presence of eavesdroppers. Although their framework of censoring sensor networks is more general, they assume that the Eve can only determine whether an individual sensor transmits its decision or not. In reality, Eve can extract more information than just merely determining the presence or absence of transmission, and hence can make a reasonably good decision regarding the PoI, based on its receptions. Therefore, in our preliminary work in [21] , we investigated the problem of designing sensor quantizers for a distributed detection network that maximize the difference in the KLDs at the FC and Eve. The objective considered in [21] , namely the difference in KLDs at the FC and Eve, does not constrain the Eve's performance. Consequently, Eve may acquire an intolerable amount of information from the sensors, and therefore, the solution (quantizer design) provided in [21] may not be satisfactory to the network designer in many practical scenarios.
In this paper, we consider a distributed detection network in the presence of binary symmetric channels (BSCs) between the sensors and the FC, as well as those between the sensors and the Eve, whose transition probabilities are known to the network designer. In contrast to our work in [21] where the goal was to design binary quantizers that maximize the difference in the KLDs at the FC and Eve, in this paper, we design optimal binary sensor quantizers that maximize KL divergence at the FC while constraining the Eve's KL divergence to a prescribed tolerance level. We consider two scenarios, one where the channels between the sensors and the FC (likewise, channels between sensors and the Eve) are identical, and the second where the channels are non-identical. In the identical channel scenario, we assume that the Eve has noisier channels than the FC's channels, and show that the structure of the optimal quantizer at the local sensors is a likelihood ratio test (LRT). We present an illustrative example where we assume that the sensors make noisy observations of a known deterministic signal. We present an algorithm to find the optimal threshold so as to maximize the KL divergence at the FC while ensuring that the Eve's KL divergence remains within tolerable limits. In the scenario where channels are non-identical, we decompose the problem into subproblems to be solved sequentially using dynamic programming. Consequently, we decouple the Eve's constraint into individual constraints, thus allowing us to solve each of these decoupled problems as in the identical sensor case.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a binary-hypothesis testing problem for distributed detection with sensors under the Neyman-Pearson framework, as shown in Fig. 1 . Let and denote the null and the alternate hypotheses respectively. Throughout this paper, we assume that the observations acquired by the sensors are i.i.d. in time, and independent (but, do not necessarily have identical distributions) in space. If the th sensor's observations are denoted as , the conditional probability density functions of under and are denoted as and respectively. For all , we assume that the th sensor employs a quantizer 1 and obtains a binary symbol at every time as given below.
where is a test-statistic and is a suitable threshold to be designed.
Let and denote the false-alarm and detection probabilities at the th sensor respectively.
Definition 1 (Operating Point): The operating point of a given detector is defined as the pair , where and represent the false alarm and detection probabilities of that detector.
In the rest of the paper, we assume that any two quantizers and are identical (equivalent), if their operating points and are identical. Furthermore, we assume that all the sensors' operating points lie above the line . This is because any point below the line contributes negatively to the overall performance in terms of error probability at the FC. Thus, we define the following.
Definition 2 (ROC Space): ROC space is the set that consists of all possible operating points above the line . In other words, Note that, (1) characterizes the general structure of any detector. Therefore, the task of designing a detector requires us to define two different entities: the test-statistic and the threshold . For the class of detectors with a fixed test-statistic , we define the following: Definition 3 (ROC Curve): ROC curve, corresponding to a given test-statistic , is the set of points within the ROC space that are obtained for different values of the threshold . Let denote the set of all feasible 2 operating points at the th sensor. Then, the region in the ROC space is upperbounded by the ROC curve corresponding to likelihood ratio tests (LRTs). We call this boundary as the LRT curve, and denote it as . In summary, is bounded by the LRT curve from above, and by the line from below.
Definition 4 (Kullback-Leibler Divergence): The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence at any operating point in the ROC space is defined as (2) In other words, the KL divergence at the th sensor is given by
Let denote the -dimensional space of compressed symbols at all the sensors at a given time . In this paper, we assume that the th sensor transmits its compressed symbols to the FC through a binary-symmetric channel (BSC) with transition probability . We also assume that an eavesdropper wiretaps each of these sensor transmissions through another BSC with transition probability . If and denote the received symbols at the FC and Eve respectively, the operating point at the th sensor gets transformed into and at the FC and Eve respectively, which are given as follows.
(4)
Let the contributions of the th sensor to the overall KL divergence at the FC and Eve be denoted as and respectively. Then, and are defined as follows.
Let denote the acceptance regions of the hypothesis due to any unspecified fusion rule employed at FC and Eve respectively, over a time-window . Then, the global probabilities of false alarm and miss at the FC and Eve are given by (6) where and are the rejection regions of the hypothesis at the FC and Eve respectively, and, and are the received symbols at the FC and Eve respectively, transmitted by the th sensor over a time window of length . Next, we present Stein's Lemma that addresses the asymptotic properties of the global probability of miss . Lemma 1 (Stein's Lemma [22] ): For any , let and . Then, we have (7) where and are the KL divergences at the FC and Eve respectively.
In other words, KL divergence is the error exponent for the global probability of miss when the global probability of false alarm is constrained (and diminishing to zero with time) under Neyman-Pearson framework [22] . Therefore, as a surrogate to the global probability of miss at the FC, we choose KL divergence as the performance metric in this paper. Note that, KL divergence at the FC does not depend on the fusion rule employed at the FC. As a consequence, our design holds true for any fusion rule under the Neyman-Pearson framework.
Note that and are both convex functions of and which lie in within the hyper-cube . Furthermore, in our distributed detection model, since all the sensor observations and BSCs are statistically independent from each other, we have and (8) In this paper, we design a distributed detection network where is maximized while constraining to a prescribed tolerance limit, denoted as . We present the formal problem statement and discuss the various scenarios that are addressed in this paper, as follows.
Problem 1:
Note that Constraint 1 in Problem 1 becomes degenerate for large values of . More specifically, Problem 1 is meaningful only when so that it has a non-degenerate Constraint 1 in Problem 1. This critical value is equal to Eve's KL divergence , which Eve attains when FC attains the maximum KL divergence , as proved in Lemma A.4. This maximum KL divergence can be found by solving Problem 1 in the absence of Constraint 1.
Let denote the search space in Problem 1. Note that is a convex level-set of [23] , because is a convex function of . Similarly, since LRTs are optimal in the absence of Eve (For a detailed proof, please refer to Proposition 4.1 in [11] ), is also a convex set in the ROC space. Also, since is an intersection of two convex sets, is convex.
Since is a convex function of , Problem 1 is a convex maximization problem, and therefore, the optimal solution is one of the extreme points of [23] . Note that is not necessarily a subset of , and therefore, the optimal set of binary quantizers need not necessarily be LRTs. Furthermore, the search space in Problem 1 is not a simple polytope. is an intersection of two convex sets with smooth boundaries and therefore, its boundary does not necessarily have a smooth differential at every point. Consequently, optimal search algorithms proposed to solve traditional convex maximization problems with polytope search spaces cannot be applied to find the optimal solution of Problem 1, as our problem demands a more detailed analysis of the boundary of the search space.
Therefore, in Section III, we first restrict our attention to a simpler scenario 3 where all the sensors' observations are identically distributed and, where all the channels between the sensors and the FC (likewise, channels between sensors and the Eve) are identical. This assumption results in the received symbols at the FC (likewise, received symbols at the Eve) being conditionally i.i.d., thus decomposing the problem into a distributed framework of identical sub-problems. In Section IV, we consider a more general scenario 4 where the sensor observations are conditionally independent and non-identically distributed, and the channels between the sensors and the FC (likewise, channels between sensors and the Eve) are also non-identical. In both these scenarios, we investigate the design of secure binary quantizers when .
III. OPTIMAL QUANTIZER DESIGN IN THE PRESENCE OF IDENTICAL SENSORS AND CHANNELS
In this section, we address the problem of designing optimal quantizers when all the sensors and the channels between the sensors and the FC (likewise, channels between sensors and the Eve) are identical.
For all , we have (9) Since all the sensors and their corresponding channels are identical, we remove the sensor-indices for notational simplicity. Therefore, we have and for all . Because of this, and for all , and consequently, the KLD at the FC and Eve reduces to and . In other words, if , Problem 1 reduces to the design of the quantizer at one of the identical sensors as follows.
Problem 2:
Note that, although Problem 2 is still a convex maximization problem, due to its reduced dimensionality, the problem becomes tractable. In the remaining section, we find the optimal quantizer in two stages. First, we find the structure of the optimal binary quantizers by gaining insights into the behavior of 3 In this paper, we call this scenario as "identical sensors and channels". 4 Similarly, we call this scenario as "non-identical sensors and channels". on the boundary of the Eve's constraint . Then, we present an algorithm to find the optimal threshold for this quantizer.
We start our investigation of the behavior of on the boundary of the Eve's constraint by determining the necessary conditions for guaranteeing in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: If the transition probability of the Eve's BSCs satisfies , the two necessary conditions for any sensor operating point to guarantee in the ROC space are stated as follows. (10) and (11) Proof: Since is a constant (equal to the fixed designparameter ), its first two derivatives are equal to zero. We employ these to prove the lemma.
First, we differentiate with respect to and equate it to zero, as follows. (12) Rearranging the terms in (12), we can obtain (10) .
Next, we differentiate (12) again with respect to as follows, in order to find a closed-form expression for .
Rearranging the terms in (13), we can obtain (11) . Note that (12) in Lemma 2 provides the slope of the Eve's constraint boundary . Since the slope of with respect to along the boundary has a structure similar to the slope of a line joining two points on a logarithmic curve as seen in (10), we present lower and upper bounds for the slope of this boundary curve in the ROC plane in the following lemma.
Lemma 3: The slope of the Eve's constraint boundary in the ROC plane, as defined by the set of points , is bounded on both sides as follows. (14) Proof: Given two points , due to the concavity of the function, the slope of the line joining and always lies between the slopes of the at points and respectively. Hence, this results in (14) . Note that the necessary conditions for any operating point to lie on the Eve's constraint boundary , as stated in Lemma 2, and the bounds on the slope of the same boundary curve, as given in Lemma 3, are essential to our analysis of the behavior of the sensor's KL divergence , and the FC's KL divergence, , in terms of the false alarm probability along the Eve's constraint, which is defined by . First, we investigate the behavior of the KL divergence at the sensor, which is denoted as , along the Eve's constraint . Note that this analysis can be equivalently interpreted as the case where we investigate the behavior of when the channels between the sensors and the FC are ideal. In the following proposition, we prove that is a convex function of along the curve . Proposition 1: Given that the Eve's channel is a BSC with transition probability is strictly a convex function of , for all operating points that lie in the set . Proof: Proof is provided in Appendix B. For any general BSC between the sensors and the FC, the sensor's operating point transforms linearly into . Consequently, we have the following proposition, where we analyze the behavior of for any general BSC. Proposition 2: Let the BSCs corresponding to the FC and Eve have transition probabilities . Then, is strictly a convex function of , for all operating points that lie in the set . Proof: Note that is a linear transformation of . This can be mathematically expressed as follows. (15) In other words, a composition of with an affine transformation, as given in (15) , results in . Consequently, since is a convex function, is also a convex function [24] . Thus, for any BSC with transition probability corresponding to the FC, is a convex function of . In other words, among the set of operating points that lie on the Eve's constraint boundary , the quantizers that maximize always lie on the intersection of the LRT curve and the Eve's constraint boundary . As a consequence, the optimal quantizer is LRT-based, which we state in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The optimal quantizer that maximizes the FC's KL divergence in the presence of a constraint on Eve's KL divergence is a likelihood ratio quantizer.
Proof: Let denote the search space in Problem 2. We know, from Proposition 1, that is convex with respect to along the Eve's constraint boundary on the ROC plane. Therefore, the solution of Problem 2 always lies on the extreme points of the set of operating points on the Eve's constraint boundary . Note that the region of the Eve's constraint boundary that lies within depends on the choice of .
Let be the maximum KL divergence at the Eve when the sensor employs the optimal solution to the unconstrained problem where Constraint 1 is not considered in Problem 2. The following two cases arise:
• Case-1 : Note that, in this case because the Eve's KL divergence is always within the tolerable limit when the sensor employs any operating point . Therefore, the solution to Problem 2 is the optimal LRT in this case [11] .
• Case-2 : This is equivalent to the case where . Note that we also have since there always exist operating points such that . Therefore, the boundaries of and both intersect each other. As discussed earlier in this proof, since the optimal solution is an extreme point of the Eve's constraint boundary , this is one of the intersection points that also lies on the boundary of . In other words, the optimal sensor quantizer again is a LRT.
As discussed in the proof of Theorem 1, the problem of finding the optimal quantizer reduces to the problem of finding the intersection points of the boundaries of and the Eve's constraint , and thereby, finding the corresponding threshold for the optimal LRT at the sensor.
A. Algorithm to Find the Optimal Threshold

Let
. For the sake of tractability, we consider the problem of finding optimal thresholds when is a quasi-concave 5 function of . As shown in Proposition 1, since the Eve's constraint translates into the convexity of with respect to , there are at most two points of intersection for the curves and , of which, one of them corresponds to the optimal quantizer. We present this formally in the following claim.
Claim 1: Let . If is a quasi-concave function of , then there are at most two intersection points for the curves and . The optimal quantizer corresponds to one of the two intersection points.
Therefore, the problem reduces to finding these two intersection points and comparing them with respect to each other in terms of their respective . Moreover, we wish to find the threshold for the LRT that maximizes in the presence 5 Note that
Since, KLD is always non-negative, we always have . Also, since any LRT curve cuts through the level-sets of and is concave, is a quasi-concave function of .
of Eve's constraint. Since, both and are tail-probabilities where the start of the tail is the threshold, and are both monotonically decreasing functions of the threshold . Therefore, we have the following claim.
Claim 2: The two intersection points can be found by investigating the zeros of the function , where and are parameterized by the LRT threshold .
Let denote the value of KL divergence at which reaches its maximum value. In other words, the optimal quantizer in the absence of Eve (equivalent to ), denoted as the operating point , is the same as the optimal quantizer for any . Obviously, the function has two real zeros only when . Note that only one of them provides the maximum KL divergence at the FC.
In order to find both zeros of the function , we use the bisection method where we first find the point at which attains its maximum value. Then, consider two points, one on either side of (which are at a significant distance from ) as initial points and use the bisection algorithm to find the roots of . We call these two zeros as and . Then, we compute and compare at the operating points and
. We choose that threshold as the optimal choice, which results in the maximum . For the sake of illustration, we present an example where the sensors observe the presence or absence of a known deterministic signal, which is corrupted by additive Gaussian noise.
B. Illustrative Example
We have so far shown that the optimal quantizer lies at the intersection of the curves and the LRT boundary in the ROC. But, the structure of the LRT is specific to the observation model, and therefore, it is difficult to characterize the optimal sensor quantizer, in general. Therefore, we illustrate the design methodology for an example, where the sensors observe the presence or absence of a known deterministic signal. In other words, the observations at the th sensor are modeled as follows. (17) where is the signal-of-interest and is the additive Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance . Then, the probabilities of false alarm and detection are given by (18) where is the tail probability of the standard normal distribution . Substituting (18) in (3), we obtain the KL divergence at the sensor, which is observed to be concave for this example. Therefore, as stated in Claim 1, the optimum quantizer is given by the intersection of the LRT boundary in the ROC with the Eve's constraint . Note that (18) is a parameterization of the LRT boundary, where both the ROC's coordinates are parameterized with the threshold of the LRT. Since we are interested in the intersection . As shown in Fig. 2 , is a quasi-concave function of , with the tails converging to . In other words, there are at most two zero-crossings since the function is unimodal with the two tails converging to a value less than zero. Therefore, there are at most two solutions to the . The optimum sensor threshold can be found by investigating the two zeros of , as suggested in Claim 2, and comparing them in terms of .
C. Discussion and Results
In this subsection, we first discuss the impact of the secrecy constraint on the performance of the sensor network. Obviously, when we consider , the network achieves perfect secrecy. But, this also forces the network to be blind in that . On the other extreme, consider a scenario where . This is equivalent to the case where there is no eavesdropper present in the network. In other words, the optimal quantizer is given by . For any finite , we numerically investigate the tradeoff between secrecy and performance of a given distributed detection system.
Since is the tolerable limit on the performance of Eve, the greater the information leakage we can tolerate, the better the performance of the distributed detection network. This tradeoff is captured by Fig. 3(a) , where the maximum in the presence of a constrained Eve increases with increasing . In Fig. 3(b) , we plot the corresponding optimal threshold value as a function of . Note that, beyond a certain value of , the maximum and the corresponding optimal threshold gets saturated to the optimal KLD at the FC in the absence of Eve. This saturation level for the maximum in this example is 1.28 and it is dictated by the fundamental limits enforced by the imperfect observations and channel models within the network. A similar saturation in the value of optimal threshold value is observed at about 0.945.
Next, we demonstrate the impact of the Eve's constraint on the ROC, as well as the KL divergence at the FC, in Fig. 4 , when the FC's channels are ideal . Note that this argument can be carried over to any general BSC at the FC, as the operating point is a linear transformation of . In Fig. 4 , we assume and consider two different values of . In Fig. 4 , we plot the constraint curve along with the sensor's ROC. Note that the constraint curve intersects the LRT curve at two distinct points, as stated earlier. One of these two intersection points (the intersection point to the right, in this example) is optimal, as shown in Fig. 4(b) . Note that the skewness in the ellipses in Fig. 4(b) is due to the asymmetry in the KL divergence. Also, as decreases, becomes deeper and flat-bottomed as a function of over the Eve's constraint curve
. Another important observation to be made is the fact that the optimal solution in the presence and absence of Eve (red curves) always is on the boundary of the LRT curve, although the thresholds vary depending on the scenario. Since the sufficient test-statistic is the same irrespective of the presence or absence of Eve, the network designer may implement the system in terms of a threshold that can be varied.
In practice, there exist many conditional probability distributions and for which the computation of likelihood-ratios is intractable. Also, there may be situations where these distributions are not even known to the network designer. In both these cases, the network designer may choose to employ a tractable test that is not LRT.
Let be the test-statistic employed in the sensor quantizer , as defined in (1) . Note that, by allowing randomization (linear stochastic combination of operating points) between quantizers, Carathèodary's theorem [23] and Lemma A.1 in Appendix A together makes every operating point inside the set feasible, where represents the convex-hull of a given set .
Since is convex, all of our arguments presented in Section III also hold for the case of any general non-LRT quantizer. We summarize this in the following claim:
Claim 3: Given any ROC curve based on a teststatistic , the optimal quantizer that maximizes the FC's KL divergence in the presence of a constraint on Eve's KL divergence within the set always lies on the boundary of . As discussed earlier in this subsection, this optimal operating point can be implemented by randomizing over a finite set of quantizers, all defined using the same test statistic .
IV. EFFICIENT QUANTIZER DESIGN IN THE PRESENCE OF NON-IDENTICAL SENSORS AND CHANNELS
In Section III, we have considered the case of identical sensors and channels which is similar to the case of designing the quantizer at a single sensor. But, in general, a distributed detection network may have non-identical sensors and/or non-identical channels due to the heterogeneity of spatially distributed sensors. Therefore, in this section, we investigate Problem 1 when the network has non-identical sensors and channels. Since Problem 1 is NP-Hard in general, we propose an efficient methodology for quantizer design by decomposing Problem 1 into problems that have the same structure as Problem 2 in such a way that the Eve's constraint is not violated.
Let us introduce a set of new variables , where each represents the contribution of the th sensor to the Eve's KL divergence. In other words, Problem 1 can be equivalently expressed as follows:
Problem 3:
Note that the objective function is linearly separable since the sensor observations are conditionally independent. Therefore, we define (19) where
. At any given intermediate stage, if is a constant, then the problem of maximizing reduces to the problem of maximizing . The only factor that introduces coupling in Problem 3 is Constraint 1. This motivates us to find an efficient so that Problem 3 reduces to a set of tractable problems. In our attempt to find an efficient decomposition, we ensure that Constraint 1 holds true in order to have a feasible, efficient solution. Given an efficient choice of , Problem 3 decouples into independent sub-problems, each of which can be stated as follows:
Problem 4:
Note that Problem 4 resembles Problem 2. Therefore, the optimal solution to Problem 4 can be found exactly using the same algorithm proposed in Section III. Therefore, it is sufficient to find an efficient decomposition to approximately solve Problem 3. In this paper, we adopt a dynamic programming methodology [25] that resembles the waterfilling algorithm, in order to find an efficient decomposition . The performance of our proposed methodology completely depends on the choice of .
To be more precise, the exact solution to Problem 1 can be equivalently expressed in terms of an optimal decomposition of into . Since the problem of finding optimal is intractable, we present a suboptimal (greedy) algorithm to find an efficient decomposition of as follows.
Let denote the maximum KL divergence achievable at the FC, due to the th sensor. In such a setting, Eve attains a KL divergence due to the th sensor. We define the quality of the FC's and the Eve's channels corresponding to the th sensor as . The quality represents the tradeoff between the detection performance and secrecy. Let the sensors be ordered in terms of the increasing quality as . In other words, we obtain the best tradeoff in terms of the sensor quality by considering sensors in the order of decreasing quality in our sequential allocation mechanism. Therefore, we propose a greedy decomposition of Problem 4 into sequential problems based on the sensors' quality, where is chosen such that is maximized in the presence of Eve's constraint . Note that this decoupling of into allows us to solve each of the individual problems in Problem 4 using the same method as presented in Section III.
Having ordered the nodes in terms of decreasing , we know that node achieves better tradeoff than node , if . This allows us to select nodes with lower indices to achieve the best tradeoffs between detection performance and secrecy until the resource (constraint on Eve, ) is completely utilized. Therefore, the decomposition of , as shown in (19) , allows us to sequentially select the individual sensors in an increasing order of indices. Therefore, for index , we allocate if . Otherwise, . Having allocated the Eve's constraint to Sensor 1, we move to Sensor 2. Now, the remaining tolerable leakage information at the Eve is given by , where if , or, 0 otherwise. Therefore, we solve the problem at Sensor 2 with a new constraint . As the process of selecting the nodes progresses, we reach a point where sensors are already selected and the remaining resource left, given by , is less than .
Therefore, we let and let the remaining sensors sleep in order to satisfy the secrecy constraint. 
A. Numerical Results
In order to illustrate the performance of the proposed algorithm, we consider a simple example where, for each , the th sensor's observation follows under hypothesis and under hypothesis . Note that this example demonstrates a scenario where the signal source is spaced at different distances from different sensors in the network, and the sensor observations are modelled using a path-loss attenuation channel model. In such a case, the detection probability at the th sensor can be defined as in terms of the false alarm probability , where is the corresponding SNR. Assuming that the FC has a perfect channel , while the Eve has a binary symmetric channel with transition probability at the th sensor, we have and . Then, the KL divergences at the FC and Eve are computed as shown in (8) .
For the sake of illustration, we consider a specific example in order to demonstrate the performance of the proposed greedy algorithm. We assume that all the sensors have identical sensing channels by letting , for all . The transition probabilities of the BSCs between the sensors and the FC are sampled randomly from a uniform distribution . Similarly, we let the Eve's channels' transition probabilities be sampled randomly from a uniform distribution . We present a single run of our simulation results in Fig. 5 , where we present both the KL divergence at the FC and Eve, along with the number of sensors selected in the network, as a function of when . Note that, for , the difference between the KL divergences between the FC and Eve is about 40 units. We also provide an upper bound on this difference using a benchmark comparison where we present the case where the FC has ideal channels. In the case where FC has ideal channels, the KL divergences at the FC and Eve are denoted as and respectively. Although the FC's KL divergence is always lower-bounded by Eve's KL divergence, the difference in the KL divergences at the FC and Eve depend on the quality of the channels at both FC and Eve.
Also, note that, in Fig. 5(a) , as the number of sensors increases, both and monotonically increase until reaches a critical point where . Beyond this critical point, the algorithm starts to select only those sensors that are prioritized according to the decreasing order of . Furthermore, in Fig. 5(b) , the number of selected sensors increases with increasing number of sensors in the network at the similar rate as that of . Lastly, note that the performance of the distributed inference network in terms of KL divergence saturates as increases as per intuition.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the problem of designing secure binary quantizers in a distributed detection network in the presence of binary symmetric channels. In the case of i.i.d. received symbols at the FC (likewise, i.i.d. received symbols at the Eve), we proved that LRTs are optimal in the presence of a tolerable constraint on Eve's performance. We proposed an algorithm to find the optimal LRT threshold, and presented numerical results to illustrate the performance of our network design. Furthermore, we also proposed efficient quantizer designs in the general case of non-i.i.d. received symbols at the FC and Eve by decomposing the original problem into sub-problems using a dynamic programming approach. Numerical results were presented to illustrate the efficiency of our proposed algorithm. In our future work, we will investigate the optimal decomposition of the original problem in the general case of non-i.i.d. received symbols at the FC and Eve. In addition, we will also investigate various mitigation schemes that enhance the performance of a distributed detection network in the presence of eavesdroppers. In the future, we will also consider an extension to this work where the network has no knowledge about Eve's channels. This problem is important from a practical point of view.
APPENDIX A LINEAR TRANSFORMATIONS OF SENSOR OPERATING POINTS IN THE ROC SPACE
In this Appendix, we investigate the impact of linear transformations on the operating point in the ROC space due to binary symmetric channels (BSC) between a given sensor and the FC (Eve). Let the operating point of a given quantizer be denoted as . As mentioned earlier, the sensor's quantizer characteristics are represented using its operating point in the sensor's ROC. Also, consider two BSCs with transition probabilities and , each of which transforms the operating point into and . Let . In the following lemma, we present a useful relationship between and . Lemma A.1: Let . Then, and always lie on the line segment joining and . In addition, the following inequality holds true.
(20)
Proof: Consider a BSC with transition probability , which transforms the operating point into . Then, the equation of the line joining and is given by (21) where is some arbitrary point on the line. Substituting and , we have (22) Rearranging the terms in (22) , we have (23) Simplifying (23), we have (24) Note that the line represents the set of operating points for which the KL divergence becomes zero. Therefore, let us investigate the point where (21) intersects the line . Substituting , we have
In other words, the line in (21) intersects line for any transition probability . In other words, the points and are collinear. In fact, as . In other words, for a given sensor's operating point , the transformed operating point slides along the line segment joining and . This sliding behavior can be investigated by analyzing the distance between and , in terms of increasing , as shown in Fig. 6 . We denote the Euclidian distance between and as
. Differentiating with respect to , we have (25) since the function is concave and attains a maximum value of at . In other words, slides towards as increases. Consequently, as shown in Fig. 6 , is farther away from than on the line joining and , since . Note that the slope of the line joining (0, 0) and is , and similarly, in the case of . Since is closer to to , as shown in Fig. 6 , and the slope tends to 1 as the transition probability approaches . A similar argument holds for the slope of the lines that join and with (1, 1). Therefore, the inequality given in (20) holds.
In order to understand the impact of this transformation on the performance of the network, let us now analyze the KL divergence at some arbitrary operating point due to a BSC with transition probability operating on the sensor operating point . In the following lemma, we show that the KL divergence decreases with increasing .
Lemma Consequently , and, therefore is a monotonically decreasing function of , for all . Having analyzed the impact of BSCs on the ROC, let us now shift our focus on finding those quantizers that maximize the KL divergence at the sensor or the FC. Given any operating point at the sensor, we investigate the behavior of with respect to , for a fixed value of .
Lemma A.3: The optimal quantizer always lies on the boundary of the set of all feasible quantizer designs.
Proof: For a fixed value of , we differentiate with respect to as follows.
(30) From Lemma A.1, we have . In other words, is a monotonically increasing function of , for a fixed value of . Hence, we are always interested in quantizer rules whose operating points lie on the boundary of the set of all feasible quantizers.
In summary, the sensor operating point chosen on the LRT boundary slides towards the point as the channel deteriorates (increasing ), which, in turn, degrades the KLD of any decision rule to zero. Therefore, we address the problem of finding the operating point on the boundary which maximizes , where the boundary is dictated by the Eve's constraint and the boundary of . Lemma A. 4 But, this is not be possible for any given transition probability . Therefore, by contradiction, Lemma A.4 holds true.
APPENDIX B PROOF FOR PROPOSITION 1
To show that is a convex function of in the presence of a constraint on Eve, we investigate the second-order differential of with respect to . The closed-form expression for the firstorder differential of with respect to is given by
The second-order differential of can therefore be obtained by differentiating (35) with respect to as follows.
(36) Fig. 7 . Partition of ROC into three regions.
Note that the first term in (36) can be rewritten as follows.
(37) Note that (37) allows us to use the necessary condition for the operating point to lie on the Eve's constraint curve , as given in (11) . Therefore, we substitute (11) from the Lemma 2 in (37), and use this in (36) to have the following. Note that, if is a convex function of along the Eve's constraint curve . Since we are only interested in the region where and for all practical purposes, we restrict our analysis of the sign of in this region. In order to analyze the sign of , we divide the achievable region in the receiver-operating characteristics into three regions, as shown in Fig. 7 .
(44)
Obviously, in region and .
Therefore, . Henceforth, we analyze the sign of in the remaining regions and .
Region
: In this region, . Therefore, we use the upper bound on , presented in (14) , to find the sign of as follows.
Substituting (14) in (43), we have
Since in region , we have . Therefore, substituting this inequality in (45), we have (46)
: In this region, since , we use the lower bound on , presented in (14) , in order to find the sign of .
Substituting (14) in (43), we have (47) Since we are only interested in the region where , (48) can be lower-bounded as follows.
(48)
Hence, for BSCs with is a convex function of along the constraint .
